Nigeria’s agric revolution program

[SecGen]

Possible structure of Conpro’s agric revolution program

Excerpts from Gemini’s report

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the concept of a single “average farm” is a statistical simplification that obscures a vast and complex global spectrum of agricultural models. The findings identify five distinct archetypes that characterize the dominant farming structures across these countries.

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Fourth, the Dualistic Agricultural Economies, a structure evident in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and to a degree in Brazil and Ukraine, are characterized by the coexistence of two parallel systems. A small number of large-scale, highly commercialized, and globally competitive farms operate alongside a vast number of smallholder or subsistence plots, creating starkly different economic and social realities within the same national borders.

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In Brazil, for instance, establishments with more than 2,500 hectares account for a mere 0.3% of the total number of farms, yet they control a staggering 32.8% of the country’s agricultural land.

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To facilitate this deeper analysis, the report categorizes the eleven countries into five distinct agricultural archetypes. These archetypes, which serve as the primary lens for comparison, are:

1. Vast, Mechanized Exporters (USA, Brazil)

2. Intensive, High-Value European Producers (UK, France, Netherlands)

3. Technologically Advanced, Resource-Constrained Innovators (Israel)

4. Dualistic Agricultural Economies (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Ukraine)

5. Smallholder-Dominant Systems (China, Nigeria)

Analysis

The dualistic combines two archetypes. Since it’s possible for a country to have, at the same time, each of these models, as we intend to have in Nigeria, as a different archetype we will refer to as MIXED, then there are really only 4 models.

If we structure this program as one single “agric revolution program”, we may require that it has 4 distinct lanes, each in which must at least match the world’s best in each of those models.

Should a different sub program manager be appointed for each of these? By who? The market operator or the program manager?

To ensure unity of vision and complete taking of ownership, the program manager should be allowed to make the appointments.

Should they be sub program managers or consultants? The PTF used a consultant structure that was important: accountability issues apart.

ChatGPT’s report on PTF and APC Consultants

Nigeria’s Petroleum Trust Fund PTF as a model for program management

ChatGPT Scope The report Illustration

My conclusion

1. There should be a single national program manager with substantial but not absolute autonomy. The buck always stops at the market operator’s table.

2. The program manager can use different levels of consultants who may report to each other.

3. Quite unusually, consultants may be required to bring some fractional cash collateral so that they also have a financial stake. This may be minimal, eg 1% or even 0.1% and may be provided by Onlenders and Francos.

4. Being institutional receiving agents of value and therefore issuers of primary warrants who must bring some fractional cash backing for the warrants they issue, Valuehouses, Onlenders, Francos and Program Managers may have substantial capital adequacy obligations, let’s assume 10% for now. (It may be reduced later, especially as the core value is accepted credit offers and not money). These franchises may get publicly listed so that they can channel public capital to meet the needs of their associates, consultants and project managers who may be required to also bring some cash backing.